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Judicial Ethics and Supreme Court Exceptionalism
AMANDA FROST*
ABSTRACT
In his 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, Chief Justice John
Roberts cast doubt on Congress's authority to regulate the Justices' ethical
conduct, declaring that the constitutionality of such legislation has "never been
tested." Roberts' comments not only raise important questions about the re-
lationship between Congress and the Supreme Court, they also call into question
the constitutionality of a number of existing and proposed ethics statutes. Thus,
the topic deserves close attention.
This Essay contends that Congress has broad constitutional authority to
regulate the Justices' ethical conduct, just as it has exercised control over other
vital aspects of the Court's administration, such as the Court's size, quorum
requirement, oath of office, and the dates of its sessions. The Essay acknowl-
edges, however that Congress's power to regulate judicial ethics is constrained
by separation of powers principles and the need to preserve judicial indepen-
dence. Furthermore, legislation directed at the Supreme Court Justices in
particular must take into account the Court's special status as the only
constitutionally required court, as well as its position at the head of the third
branch of government. Although these are important limitations on Congress's
power, existing and proposed ethics legislation fall well within them.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In his mild-mannered way, Chief Justice John Roberts has set the stage for a
constitutional conflict between Congress and the Supreme Court. Roberts' 2011
Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary focused on judicial ethics, a subject
that has been much in the news lately.' In the course of that year, several of
the Justices were publicly criticized for their alleged involvement in political
fundraisers; 2 acceptance of gifts' and travel expenses paid for by groups with
political viewpoints;4 failure to report a spouse's employment;5  and, most
controversially, refusal to recuse themselves from the constitutional challenges to
the health care reform legislation despite alleged conflicts of interest.6 Existing
laws already cover some of this claimed misconduct, and the spate of negative
publicity inspired the introduction of new federal legislation that would further
regulate the Justices' behavior.7 Roberts' Year-End Report acknowledged these
1. 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (Dec. 31, 2011), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/year-end/201 1year-endreport.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Jeff Shesol, Op-Ed, Should the Justices Keep their Opinions to Themselves?, N.Y. TIMES,
Jun. 28, 2011, at A23 (describing Justice Alito's attendance at the American Spectator's fund-raising dinner,
where he had previously given the keynote address, and Justices Thomas's and Scalia's attendance at political
strategy meetings hosted by the conservative Koch brothers); R. Jeffrey Smith, Professors Ask Congress for an
Ethics Code for Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2011 (describing public interest group's criticism of
Justices Thomas and Scalia for attending political events hosted by the Koch brothers); Nan Aron, Op-Ed., An
Ethics Code for the High Court, WASH. POsT, Mar. 13, 2011 (same).
I do not take a position on the merits of these allegations of unethical conduct by the Justices, in part be-
cause some of the facts underlying these claims are in dispute. The allegations are noted here only to support the
point that the Justices' ethical conduct is regularly the subject of public debate, which in turn supports calls for
congressional oversight.
3. See Mike McIntire, Friendship of Justice and Magnate Puts Focus on Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 20,11,
at Al (describing real estate magnate Harlan Crow's gifts to Justice Thomas and his wife, as well as his financial
support for projects in which they have an interest).
4. See Editorial, The Justices' Junkets, WASH. PosT, Feb. 21, 2011, at A14 (criticizing Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor for taking foreign trips paid for by organizations with "liberal agendas").
5. See Jeffrey Toobin, Partners, NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2011, at 41 (reporting that in January 2011, Justice
Clarence Thomas amended several of his financial disclosure forms because he failed to record his wife's
employment).
6. See, e.g., Editorial, The Supreme Court's Recusal Problem, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 1, 2011, at A38 ("Liberals in
Congress have called for Justice Clarence Thomas to recuse himself from the review of the health care reform
law because his wife, Virginia, has campaigned fervently against it. Conservatives insist that Justice Elena
Kagan should remove herself from the case because, they claim, as solicitor general she was more involved in
shaping the law than she lets on."); Toobin, supra note 5, at 41 (reporting that in February 2011, 74 members of
Congress "called on Thomas to recuse himself from any legal challenges to President Obama's health-care
reform, because his wife has been an outspoken opponent of the law").
7. See Smith, supra note 2, at 41 (describing the controversies regarding the Justices' political activities and
reporting that Representative Chris Murphy was planning to introduce legislation to address the problem); see
also Erich Lichtblau, Democrats Seek to Impose Tougher Supreme Court Ethics, N.Y. TIMEs, Sep. 8, 2011,
available at http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/democrats-seek-to-impose-tougher-supreme-court-
ethics/?scp=4&sq=ginsburg%20ethics%20%22supreme%20court%22&st=cse; Robyn Haig Cain, Rep. Slaugh-
ter Wants a Supreme Court Code of Ethics, Mar. 9, 2012, available at http://blogs.findlaw.com/supreme-court/
2012/03/rep-slaughter-wants-a-supreme-court-code-of-ethics.html (describing a letter signed by Representative
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accusations of impropriety, as well as the legal framework that governs in this
area.8 Then, in a shot across Congress's bow, he stated that the Court had "never
addressed" Congress's constitutional authority to prescribe ethics rules for the
Supreme Court9-which many took to be a broad hint that, at least in the Chief
Justice's view, Congress lacks that authority.'o
To be sure, the Chief Justice was careful to note that his "judicial responsibili-
ties preclude [him] from commenting on any ongoing debates about particular
issues or the constitutionality of any enacted legislation or pending proposals.""
But he went on to say that the "Court has never addressed whether Congress
may impose [ethical] requirements on the Supreme Court,"l 2 and noted that the
constitutionality of the recusal statute in particular has "never been tested."' 3
With those words, Roberts put the nation on notice that Congress's authority to
regulate the Justices' ethical conduct is an open question.
The Chief Justice's Report raises serious questions about the constitutional
status of existing ethics legislation, as well as the Supreme Court Justices'
willingness to abide by laws that at least some of them may consider to be in-
valid, and thus non-binding.14 His comments also cast doubt on the constitution-
ality of the Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011-a bill
pending at the time of the Report's publication that would subject the Justices to
investigation and possible sanctions for ethics violations, and require external
review of an individual Justice's recusal determinations.' 5 Although the Report
has provoked vociferous responses from those on either side of the issue," thus
Louise Slaughter and thirty other members of Congress calling on the Supreme Court Justices to adopt a formal
code of ethics).
8. 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, supra note 1, at 5.
9. Id. at 6 ("The Court has never addressed whether Congress may impose [financial reporting require-
ments and limitations on the receipts of gifts and outside earned income] on the Supreme Court. The Justices
nevertheless comply with those provisions."); see also id. at 7 ("As in the case of financial reporting and gift
requirements, the limits on Congress's power to require recusal have never been tested.").
10. Nan Aron, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 4, 2012, John Roberts On Ethics: Move Along, Nothing to See Here,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nan-aron/john-roberts-on-ethics-mo b_ 184164.html (Chief Justice Roberts'
report "inferred" that "no one can make rules for [the Supreme Court]"). See, e.g., William Yeomans & Herman
Schwartz, Roberts to America: Trust Us, PoLIco, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71895_Page3.html
("Roberts' discussion may also reflect the astonishing view in his annual report that legislative limitations on a
justice's activities are unconstitutional.") (last visited March 16, 2013).
11. 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, supra note I at 3.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 7.
14. After stating that the constitutionality of ethics legislation is an open question, Roberts went on to declare
that the "Justices nevertheless comply with these provisions." See id. at 6. However, his basis for this assertion
is unclear.
15. Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 112th Cong. (2011), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl12-862. The proposed law is described in more detail in
Part II.A.6.
16. See, e.g., Editorial, Judicial Ethics and the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 2012, at A24; Eric J.
Segall, Op-Ed, An Ominous Silence on the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at 26; Editorial, Umpires
in Black: Roberts Says the High Court is up for the Big Game, Prrr. PosT-GAzEffE, Jan. 5, 2012, at B4;
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far there has been little academic analysis of the constitutional issues involved."
This Essay seeks to fill that gap. As is true for most constitutional questions,
Congress's authority to regulate the Justices' ethical conduct turns not just on
the Constitution's text, but also on its structure, the original understanding, and
longstanding tradition in this area.' 8 Accordingly, the Essay examines the
relevant text of Articles I and III of the Constitution to locate the source of
Congress's authority to enact laws regulating the Justices' ethical conduct, as
well as constraints on any such power, and then discusses the history of
Congress's oversight and administration of the Supreme Court Justices' ethical
conduct. As part of this analysis, the Essay considers whether Congress is more
constrained when regulating the ethical conduct of Justices on the U.S. Supreme
Court than judges serving on lower federal courts, as the Chief Justice seemed to
suggest in his Report.
The Essay is structured as follows: Part II provides an overview of existing and
proposed ethics legislation and briefly describes the constitutional objections to
that legislation, particularly as applied to the Supreme Court. Part IHl analyzes the
Constitution's text and structure to determine the scope of, and limits on,
Congress's authority to regulate the Supreme Court Justices' ethics. Although
the Constitution requires that there be a Supreme Court, it did not make that
institution self-executing, and thus Congress was empowered by the Necessary
and Proper Clause to enact legislation implementing the judicial power. For
example, vital matters such as the Court's size, the dates of its sessions, and even
the words of the oath each Justice takes before ascending to the bench are all set
by federal legislation. Ethics statutes, which promote the effective and legitimate
exercise of the "judicial power," fall well within Congress's broad legislative
authority over the Court's administration and operation. That said, Congress's
power to regulate the Supreme Court's ethical conduct is limited by separation of
powers concerns, such as the need not only to preserve judicial independence, but
also to demonstrate respect for the Court's status as the head of a co-equal branch
Editorial, The Recusal Question, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 3, 2012, at 14; David G. Savage, Chief Justice: Each
Colleague Decides on Merits for Recusal, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 2, 2012, at 13; Sherrilyn Ifill, The Chief Strikes Out,
Concurring Opinions (Jan. 4, 2012, 12:14 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/01/sherrilyn-
ifills-the-chief-strikes-out.htm.
17. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics in the Federal System: A Peek Behind Closed
Doors, 60 U. Prrr. L. REv. 189, 190 (2007) (noting that the regulation of judicial ethics "has received little
attention from academics"). One exception is a recent article by Louis Virelli, which argues that Congress lacks
the authority to regulate recusal of Supreme Court Justices, but which does not address the constitutionality of
other types of ethics legislation. See Louis J. Virelli, III, The (Un)constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal
Standards, 2011 Wis. L. REv. 1181.
18. Depending on one's theory of constitutional interpretation, some of these sources for ascertaining
constitutional meaning are more significant than others. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Judicial Discipline,
Judicial Independence, and the Constitution: A Textual and Structural Analysis, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 673 (1999)
(explaining why he puts more emphasis on constitutional text than the framers' or ratifiers' intent). Because my
goal in this essay is to raise all the reasonable arguments on either side of the issue, I canvas all the mainstream
sources typically used by courts and commentators when attempting to ascertain constitutional meaning.
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of government. 9 Part III describes how these constitutional principles serve both
to empower and restrain Congress when it seeks to regulate the Justices' ethical
conduct. Part IV examines the history of congressional-Court interactions
regarding judicial ethics, which further bolsters this Essay's claim that Congress
has the constitutional authority to regulate the Justices' ethical conduct, albeit
within limits.
Two caveats are in order. First, the Essay addresses Congress's constitutional
authority to regulate the Justices' ethical conduct, and does not discuss in any
detail the costs and benefits of such legislation. Constitutional questions are
frequently raised by opponents of such legislation, derailing the policy questions
that are also worthy of attention. Hopefully, this Essay will help to clear away the
obstacles that have too often prevented a full and frank discussion of whether
such legislation would prove beneficial.
Second, it is worth acknowledging that the Court itself may have the final say
on these constitutional questions if litigants or government institutions seek to
enforce ethics regulation against sitting Justices. In other words, unlike most
separation of powers cases, this is an issue on which the very individuals with a
personal stake in the matter may ultimately decide the constitutional issue.
Human nature being what it is, the Justices may find such legislation hard to
swallow, whatever the merits of the constitutional arguments in its favor.20 More
importantly, even if Congress has the authority to enact such legislation, it may
be preferable as a matter of both policy and precedent for the Court to regulate
itself. 21 Thus, the best course of action going forward would be to convince the
Court that it should take the lead in regulating the ethical conduct of its members
to protect its own reputation, which would diminish the need for Congress to do
so. Whatever one's views of Congress's constitutional authority in this area, one
thing is clear: If the Supreme Court policed itself, Congress would not need to
do so.
19. Judicial independence is a component of the separation of powers, though the two concepts are not
identical. See Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the Judicial Branch in
the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 31, 32 (1998) ("Although separation and independence are not
synonymous, structural separation among the branches cannot be maintained unless each branch is independent
enough to prevent the other two from usurping its powers, for which reason some measure of independence may
be inherent in a system of separated powers.").
20. Cf Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal,
53 U. KAN. L. REv. 531, 538 (2005) (describing judges' tendency to narrowly construe recusal statutes). Thus
far, however, the Justices comply with most of the ethical requirements imposed on them by Congress most of
the time. See infra Part W.B.
21. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A Constitutional Analysis,
142 U. PA. L. REv. 209, 212 (1993) ("As scholars have noted, the existence of authority to devise mechanisms
other than impeachment for judicial discipline does not itself prove that instituting those other mechanisms is
desirable."); Editorial, Trust and the Supreme Court, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 20, 2012, at Al8 ("The court should
embrace sensible ethics rules ... on its own.").
448 [Vol. 26:443
2013] JUDICIAL ETHICS AND SUPREME CouRT EXCEPTIONALISM 449
II. OVERVIEW OF ETHICS LEGISLATION
This Part surveys the current and proposed legislation regulating judicial
ethics, and then describes potential constitutional problems raised by congressio-
nal regulation of the Justices' ethical conduct. Although much of the discussion
focuses on Congress's power to regulate the ethics of all Article III judges, some
scholars claim that the Supreme Court's special constitutional status imposes
additional constraints on Congress.
A. FEDERAL LEGISLATION REGULATING JUDICIAL ETHICS
1. RECUSAL STATUTES
In 1792, Congress passed the first statute requiring lower federal court judges
to recuse themselves under certain circumstances.22 Over the years, Congress
repeatedly modified and broadened the law, but continued to limit its application
to judges on the "inferior" courts. It was not until 1948 that Congress expanded
the law to include the Justices.23
Today, three different statutes govern recusal of federal judges, of which only
Title 28, Section 455 of the United States Code applies to the Supreme Court.2 4
That statute requires "[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United
States" to "disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned," as well as for other listed grounds, such as bias or
prejudice, personal participation in the case, pecuniary interest, or a family
connection to a lawyer or party to the case.
When a party to litigation asks a judge on a lower federal court to step aside,
that judge usually decides the question for herself, though she is free to refer
the matter to another judge on the same court.2 5 If she does not recuse herself,
22. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278-79 (1792).
23. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 869, 908 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1992)).
Congress did not discuss this change at any length in the legislative history. The only mention of the decision to
include the Justices in the recusal statute comes in the House Report, which simply describes the amended
language. See H.R. Rep. No. 80-308 at A53 (1947) ("Section 24 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., applied only to
district judges. The revised section is made applicable to all justices and judges of the United States.").
24. Section 144 of Title 28, which applies only to district court judges, requires the recusal of a judge who
has a "personal bias or prejudice in the matter." A third statute, Section 47 of Title 28, provides that "[n]o judge
shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him." Although this statute applies
only to lower court judges, Supreme Court Justices generally recuse themselves from cases they heard or
decided when sitting on the lower courts. For example, Chief Justice Roberts recused himself from Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), presumably because he had served on the panel of the D.C. Circuit that issued
the decision in which certiorari had been granted.
25. See In re United States, 158 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that "a trial judge faced with a section
455(a) recusal motion may, in her discretion, leave the motion to a different judge," though "no reported case or
accepted principle of law compels her to do so . . . ").
Chief Justice Roberts observed that a "court normally does not sit in judgment of one of its own member's
recusal decisions in the course of deciding a case." 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, supra note 1,
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however, the party can appeal that decision to a higher court or seek en banc
review-although admittedly doing so is difficult as a practical matter.2 6 None-
theless, there is at least the potential for review of a district or circuit judge's
decision to remain on a case.27 The same is currently not true for the Justices on
the U.S. Supreme Court. Although there are no written rules governing recusal
procedures, the longstanding practice has been for each Justice to decide for him
or herself whether to step aside, usually without issuing any explanation.28
Conceivably, a litigant could ask the entire Supreme Court to review a Justice's
decision not to recuse him or herself,29 but none has ever done so.3 0
at 8. Although typically a district court judge decides for him or herself whether to recuse, on occasion district
court judges have referred that question to another judge on the same court. See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken,
426 F Supp. 929 (E.D. Mich. 1977); United States v. Zagari, 419 F. Supp. 494, 497 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
Furthermore, a litigant who loses a motion asking a circuit court judge to recuse may also seek rehearing before
a new panel or a rehearing en banc. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REv.
589, 639 (1987). Thus, in contrast to the Supreme Court, it is not unprecedented in the lower courts for the
recusal decision to be made by another judge on that court.
26. If a trial court denies a motion to recuse, the moving party may seek interlocutory review by petitioning
for a writ of mandamus. Most circuits make such interlocutory review hard to obtain by "placing a heavy burden
on the movant." Federal Judicial Center, Recusal: Analysis of Case Law under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 144,
69 (2002). A party may also appeal the trial judge's refusal to recuse after final judgment, but this is an
exceedingly expensive and inefficient method by which to try to obtain a new trial before a new judge.
27. See supra note 25.
28. In a letter responding to inquiries by Senators Patrick Leahy and Joseph Lieberman, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that "[t]here is no formal procedure for court review of the [recusal] decision of a justice in an
individual case. That is so because it has long been settled that each justice must decide such a question for
himself." See David G. Savage, High Court Won't Review Scalia's Recusal Decision, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004,
atAl2.
29. In Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004), the Sierra
Club filed a motion seeking the recusal of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. Alan Morrison, who served as
lead counsel for the Sierra Club, was planning to file a second motion asking the entire Court to review Justice
Scalia's decision to remain on the case if Scalia did not respond to the initial recusal motion. See E-mail from
Alan Morrison, Lerner Family Associate Dean for Public Service Law, The George Washington University Law
School, to author (Oct. 2, 2012, 4:23 PM EST) (on file with author). Shortly before the oral argument, however,
Justice Scalia filed a 21-page opinion in which he explained his reasons for refusing to recuse himself. Cheney,
541 U.S. at 916,923 (Scalia, J., mem.)
30. The Supreme Court's decision to hear a constitutional challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act prompted questions about whether Justices Clarence Thomas and Elena Kagan should recuse
themselves from the case. Section 455 of Title 28 requires a Justice to disqualify herself if her "impartiality
might reasonably be questioned," or if she "participated as counsel, advisor or material witness concerning the
proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy." Some Members
of Congress called for Justice Thomas to recuse himself because his wife was paid to lobby against that statute,
which they contend casts doubt on Justice Thomas' ability to remain impartial. See Toobin, supra note 5, at 41
(reporting that in February 2011, 74 members of Congress "called on Thomas to recuse himself from any legal
challenges to President Obama's health-care reform, because his wife has been an outspoken opponent of the
law"). Others asserted that Justice Kagan should step aside, arguing that she "participated as counsel" or
"advisor" on the legislation while serving as Solicitor General. See The Supreme Court's Recusal Problem,
supra note 6, at A38; Segall, supra note 16. However, none of the litigants filed a motion seeking the recusal of
either Justice, and neither recused themselves.
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2. THE ETmCs IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 requires most high-level federal
officials in all three branches of the federal government to file annual reports
in which they publicly disclose aspects of their finances, such as their out-
side income, the employment of their spouses and dependent children, in-
vestments, reimbursements for travel-related costs, gifts, and household lia-
bilities. 3 ' Any person who "knowingly and willfully" falsifies such a report,
or fails to file a report, is subject to civil and criminal penalties.3 2 The Act applies
to all federal judges, including Supreme Court Justices. Judges and Justices
alike are required to file their disclosure forms with the Judicial Conference
of the United States 3 4-the administrative and policy-making body for the
federal courts 35-and with the clerk of the court on which the judge or Justice
sits.36 Those reports are then made publicly available. The Act also requires
the Judicial Conference to refer to the Attorney General any person who the
Conference "has reasonable cause to believe has willfully failed to file a report or
has willfully falsified or willfully failed to file information required to be
reported."3
3. THE ETHICS REFORM ACT OF 1989
The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 placed strict limits on outside earned income
and gifts for all federal officials, including federal judges. Judges and Justices are
prohibited from most outside employment with the exception of teaching, for
which any compensation must be pre-approved by the Judicial Conference. 8 In
addition, they may not accept honoraria for an appearance, speech, or article,
though reimbursement for travel expenses is permitted. Finally, the Act bars
31. 5 U.S.C. app. 4, § 102 (2012).
32. 5 U.S.C. app. 4, § 104(a).
33. 5 U.S.C. app. 4, § 101(f)(l1).
34. 5 U.S.C. app. 4, § 103(h)(1)(B).
35. Congress created the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1922 to assist in the administration of
the federal judiciary. The Chief Justice chairs the Judicial Conference, and its members include the chief judge
of each of the 13 federal circuits as well as a district court judge from each regional circuit and the chief judge of
the Court of International Trade. See 28 U.S.C. § 331.
36. 5 U.S.C. app. 4, § 103(a).
37. 5 U.S.C. app. 4, § 104(b). In January 2011, Justice Thomas amended his annual financial disclosure
reports going back several years because he failed to report his wife's consulting work for a Michigan college
and for the Heritage Foundation. Letter from Clarence Thomas, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Committee on
Financial Disclosure (Jan. 21, 2001), SCRIBD, available at http://www.scribd.com/JWatchDC/d/74643732-
Clarence-Thomas-Financial-Disclosure-Report-for-clarence-thomas-disc-amend-01212011. In a letter accom-
panying the amendment, Justice Thomas explained that the omission was inadvertent. Id.
38. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. app. 7 § 502(a)(5).)
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judges and Justices from receiving gifts from anyone whose "interests may be
substantially affected by" the performance of their duties.
4. THE JUDICIAL COUNCILs REFORM AND JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980
The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
198040 ("Judicial Conduct and Disability Act") authorizes anyone to file a
complaint alleging that a judge "has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts."4 '
Complaints are then reviewed by the Chief Judge of the Circuit, who may dismiss
them, conclude the proceedings after finding that "appropriate corrective action
has been taken" or that "action on the complaint is no longer necessary," or
appoint a committee of district and circuit court judges to investigate further.42
The committee is required to submit a report of its investigation to the judicial
council of the circuit43-a pre-existing administrative body headed by the Chief
Judge of the Circuit and made up of an equal number of district and circuit judges
from that circuit"-which may conduct a further investigation, dismiss the
complaint, or take action to "assure the effective and expeditious administration
of the business of the courts."4 5 The "possible action" the council may take
includes a public or private censure of the judge, an order that no further cases be
assigned to the judge for a "time certain,"460r a request that the judge voluntarily
retire.47 Finally, the council may refer the matter to the Judicial Conference of the
United States, which in turn can recommend impeachment to the House of
Representatives.48
The Act applies to circuit judges, district court judges, bankruptcy judges,
and magistrate judges, but not Supreme Court Justices. 4 9 The Supreme Court
Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011, pending at the time that Roberts wrote
his annual report, would change that by placing the Justices under a similar,
39. 5 U.S.C. § 7353(a)(2) (2011). The statute authorizes the Judicial Conference to adopt rules and
regulations implementing these provisions, and to make "reasonable exceptions" to the gift restrictions
when "appropriate." Id. at § 7353(b)(1).
40. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1988).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (2006).
42. 28 U.S.C. §§ 352, 353 (2006). Either the complainant or the judge may petition for review of the Chief
Judge's final order under section 352 by the judicial council for the circuit.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 353(c).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 332(a) (2006). By statute, each circuit must establish a judicial council which "shall make all
necessary and appropriate orders for the effective and expeditious administration of justice within its circuit."
28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1) (2006).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 354(a) (2006).
46. 28 U.S.C. 354(a)(2) (2006).
47. 28 U.S.C. 354(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
48. 28 U.S.C. 355(b) (2006).
49. 28 U.S.C. 351(d)(1) (2006) (defining "judge" as "circuit judge, district judge, bankruptcy judge, or
magistrate judge").
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though not identical, level of oversight for alleged ethics violations.o
5. THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES
The Code of Conduct for United States Judges is not a federal statute, but
rather a set of ethical guidelines adopted by the Judicial Conference in 1973 to
guide the conduct of federal judges. 5 ' The Code is connected to the Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act, however, in that violations of the Code can be cause
for complaint, investigation, and sanction under the Act.5 2 Like the Act, the Code
excludes the Supreme Court Justices."
The Code lays out a set of ethical principles to protect the "integrity and
independence of the judiciary."5 4 Its five canons are broadly worded. For
example, Canon 2 instructs judges to "avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety," and Canon 3 requires them to "perform the duties of the office
fairly, impartially, and diligently." Although the Code is at times more specific-
for instance, declaring that a judge "should not hold membership in any
organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
religion or national origin"-it of course cannot address every ethical dilemma
facing judges. The Judicial Conference has authorized its Committee on Codes of
Conduct to issue advisory opinions about the Code "when requested by ajudge to
whom this Code applies."5 These advisory opinions provide further guidance for
judges seeking to avoid ethics problems.
The Code's primary purpose is to provide judges with "guidance" on ethical
matters. Nonetheless, its canons are not optional; federal judges who violate the
Code may be subject to investigation and sanction. Commentary to Canon 1 of
the Code explains that the Code "may .. . provide standards of conduct for
application in proceedings under the. . . Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980," although that commentary also cautions that "[n]ot every violation of the
Code should lead to disciplinary action."
50. For further description of the bill, see infra Part H.A.6.
51. Code of Conductfor United States Judges (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/VolO2A-ChO2.pdf.
52. See Code of Conduct for United States Judges at 2-3, Canon I cmt.
53. See Code of Conduct for United States Judges at 2-3 ("The Code applies to United States circuit judges,
district judges, Court of International Trade judges, Court of Federal Claims judges, bankruptcy judges, and
magistrate judges.").
54. See Code of Conduct for United States Judges at 2-3, Canon I.
55. Code of Conduct for United States Judges at 1-2, Introduction.
56. Code of Conduct for United States Judges at 3, Canon I cmt. Several of the Justices have publicly stated
that they follow the Code of Conduct, even though it does not apply to them. See Eileen Malloy, Supreme Court
Justices Already Comply with Ethics Rules, Kennedy, Breyer Say, 79 U.S. L. WKLY. 2389, 2389 (Apr. 19, 2011).
In his 2011 Year-End Report, Chief Justice Roberts asserted that "[a]ll Members of the Court do in fact consult
the Code of Conduct in assessing their ethical obligations," despite the fact that it is not binding. 2011 Year-End
Report on the Federal Judiciary, supra note 1, at 4. As others have noted, however, some of the Justices'
extra-judicial activities appear inconsistent with the Code. For instance, Justices Scalia and Thomas were
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6. THE SUPREME CouRr TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 2011
On March 1, 2011, Representative Christopher Murphy introduced the
Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011 (hereinafter "Murphy
Bill"), which would impose additional ethics obligation on Supreme Court
Justices to bring them into parity with judges on the lower courts.57 Although the
Murphy Bill was never referred to the full House for a vote, its contents have
nonetheless inspired debate over Congress's power to regulate the Justice's
ethical conduct.58
The Murphy Bill provides that the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
"shall apply to Supreme Court justices to the same extent as it applies to circuit
and district court judges." The Bill then delegates to the Judicial Conference
the responsibility to "establish procedures modeled after the procedures set forth
in [the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980]" for "review[ing] and in-
vestigat[ing]" a complaint that a Justice of the Supreme Court has violated
the Code of Conduct, and then taking "further action, where appropriate ... with
respect to such complaints."5
The Bill also creates new procedures to govern the Justices' recusal decisions
under Title 28, Section 455 of the United States Code. The Justices must publicly
state their reasons for recusing themselves or, alternatively, their basis for
denying a party's motion seeking recusal. The Bill also requires the Judicial
Conference of the United States to "establish a process" by which a Justice's
refusal to recuse is reviewed by "other justices or judges of a court of the United
States"-a group that includes retired Justices and senior judges-who "shall
decide whether the justice with respect to whom the motion is made should be so
allegedly speakers at a fundraising event for the Federalist Society, which is at odds with the Code provision
stating that a judge "may not be a speaker, a guest of honor, or featured on the program" of a fundraiser. See A
Question of Integrity: Politics, Ethics, and the Supreme Court, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, http://www.afj.org/connect-
with-the-issues/supreme-court-ethics-reform/federalist-society-fundraiser.pdf (last visited March 16, 2013);
see also Andrew Rosenthal, Step Right Up. Buy Dinner with a Justice, TAKING NoTE, (Nov. 10, 2011, 4:30 PM),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/ll/10/step-right-up-buy-dinner-with-a-justice/. Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg has spoken at events sponsored by the National Organization for Women, and Justice Stephen Breyer
has attended the Renaissance Weekend, see Shesol, supra note 2, an event closely associated with Bill and
Hillary Clinton. Attendance at either event could be viewed as violating the Code's requirement that judges
"refrain from political activity." See The Justices' Junkets, supra note 4, at A14 (criticizing Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor for taking foreign trips paid for by organizations with "liberal agendas"). Citing these
activities, Members of Congress and numerous newspaper editorials and op-eds have called for the Justices to
agree to be bound by the Code of Conduct or variations on it. See Letter from Richard Durbin, et al., U.S.
Senators, to John Roberts, Chief Justice of the United States (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://www.afj.org/
connect-with-the-issues/supreme-court-ethics-reformletter-to-supreme-court-2-13-12.pdf; see also Editorial,
Judicial Ethics and the Supreme Court, supra note 16, at A24; Aron, supra note 2.
57. Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011, supra note 15.
58. See, e.g., 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, supra note I (taking note of the pending
legislation); Virelli, supra note 17, at 1205 n.140 (questioning the constitutionality of the pending legislation).
59. Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011, supra note 15.
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disqualified."60
The legislation is unusually open-ended, giving the Judicial Conference
discretion to establish procedures for reviewing complaints regarding the
Justices' conduct and Justices' refusal to recuse themselves. For example,
theoretically the bill would allow the Judicial Conference to assign a single
district court judge the power to "review" a Supreme Court Justice's refusal to
recuse-an unseemly and potentially unconstitutional arrangement. On the other
hand, it would also permit the Judicial Conference to delegate review of the
recusal decision to the entire Supreme Court sitting en banc-a procedure on
much stronger constitutional footing. 6 ' Thus, if the Murphy Bill were to become
law as written, its constitutionality could turn on the Judicial Conference's
methods of implementation.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO ETHICS LEGISLATION
The constitutionality of the ethics laws described above has never been
addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court.6 2 Although a few critics-including some
of the Justices themselves 63 -have raised constitutional concerns about applying
ethics laws to the Supreme Court, there has been no focused academic analysis of
Congress's authority to regulate the Justices' ethical conduct.
No one doubts that Congress has constitutional authority to enact legislation
regarding at least some aspects of judicial administration, including judicial
ethics, under its Article I authority to make all laws "necessary and proper" to
carry out its constitutional mandate.M But its powers are not unlimited. Congress
must not legislate in ways that undermine the separation of powers, and in
particular in ways that threaten judicial independence, which are constitutionally
enshrined values. 5 Furthermore, Congress may be more constrained when
it comes to regulating the ethical conduct of U.S. Supreme Court Justices. Unlike
the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court's existence is mandated by the
Constitution, and it sits atop the judicial hierarchy. Congress therefore lacks the
power to control the jurisdiction and structure of the Supreme Court to the same
60. Id.
61. See infra Part III.B.
62. Judge Stephen Chandler challenged the constitutionality of a similar disciplinary system in place in 1970
under which the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit barred him from hearing new cases, but the Court
sidestepped the issue. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 77 (1970).
63. Justice Anthony Kennedy recently testified before Congress that Congress would encounter a
"constitutional problem" were it to attempt to make the Code of Conduct binding on the Justices because it
would be "structurally unprecedented for district and circuit court judges to make rules that Supreme Court
judges have to follow." See Malloy, supra note 56, at 2389; see also 2011 Year-End report on the Federal
Judiciary, supra note 1, at 6-7.
64. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
65. U.S. CONst. art. III, § I ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
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degree it does the lower federal courts, and cannot alter the Court's position at the
head of the judicial department. A few scholars argue that some of the provisions
in the existing and proposed ethics legislation transgress these boundaries, and a
few Justices have suggested that they share this view.
These constitutional questions regarding Congress's authority to regulate the
Justices' ethical conduct are worthy of closer analysis than they have thus far
received in the academic literature. Parts III and IV will address these issues,
elaborating on them and responding to them with reference to the Constitution's
text and structure, as well to the original understanding and longstanding
practice.
III. CONGRESS'S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES' ETHICAL CONDUCT
The text of the Constitution is a useful starting point for thinking about
Congress's power to regulate the Justices' ethical conduct, but it provides no easy
answers. The Constitution is a remarkably spare document, and Article III, which
establishes the federal judiciary, is no exception. The three short sections of that
Article contain almost no discussion of how federal courts are to exercise the
"judicial Power," leaving many gaps to be filled by reference to constitutional
structure, original intent, and longstanding practice.
Section 1 of Article III states: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." The second and final sentence of
Section 1 provides that judges on both the "inferior" and "supreme" courts "shall
hold their Offices during good Behavior" and prohibits Congress from reducing
their compensation. Section 2 describes the subject matter of the "Cases" and
"Controversies" that federal courts are empowered to hear. Section 2 then lists
those few categories of cases that fall within the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction and states that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction
over all other categories of cases "with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make."66 That is all Article IHl has to say about
the structure and activities of the judicial branch.
Further information about the relationship between Congress and the courts
can be found in Article I, which provides that Congress has the authority to
"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."67 Also relevant is Con-
gress's Article I power to make Laws "which shall be necessary and proper" for
executing its powers.6 8 Finally, Congress can remove federal judges, like other
66. The third and final section of Article III defines the crime of treason and describes how it shall be
adjudicated, and thus is not relevant to the topic of this Essay.
67. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
68. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
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69federal officers, through the impeachment process.
As this brief overview suggests, the Constitution leaves many important
questions unanswered about Congress's power to enact legislation affecting the
federal courts. Nonetheless, some textualist arguments can be marshaled in favor
of Congress's power to regulate the Justices' ethical conduct, albeit within limits.
A. THE SOURCES OF CONGRESS'S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE THE JUSTICES' ETHICS
1. NECESSARY & PROPER CLAUSE
Congress's authority to enact ethics legislation, like its power over judicial
administration more generally, is rooted in the Constitution's implicit assumption
that Congress would play a major role in effectuating the Supreme Court's
exercise of judicial power. In contrast to the executive and legislative branches,
the judicial branch is not self-executing, and thus the political branches had to
take action for it to come into being.70 Article III leaves vital questions about the
Supreme Court's daily activities unanswered, such as the size of that Court and
the dates of its sessions. As a textual matter, then, Congress's power to manage
the federal courts arises from the gaps in Article III, coupled with its Article I
authority to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution ... all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States."7 ' These sources of authority justify a wide range of legislation
concerning judicial administration, including the ethical conduct of the judges
and Justices who serve on those courts.
The Constitution contains no information about how the Supreme Court would
exercise the judicial power as a practical matter.72 Nor does it explicitly give the
federal courts the power to control their internal operating rules, as it does for
the House and Senate.7 Accordingly, the first Congress was constitutionally
empowered-perhaps even obligated-to enact legislation settling these crucial
logistical and administrative matters. 74 As Professor James Pfander has observed,
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cl. 6.
70. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
20 (6th ed. 2009).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Congress's control over the lower federal courts is further bolstered by its Article
I, section 8 authority to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." This provision, of course, cannot
provide any constitutional authority for Congress's regulation of the U.S. Supreme Court.
72. In contrast, the Constitution provides that Congress must "assemble at least once in every Year" on the
"first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. The
Constitution also establishes that a majority of the members of each House must be present to constitute a
quorum. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
73. "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour,
and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5.
74. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 209 (Harold W. Chase & Craig
R. Ducat eds, 14th ed. 1978) ("Although a Supreme Court is provided for by the Constitution, the organization
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Article III "leaves Congress in charge of many of the details" necessary to
implement federal judicial power, and "Article I confirms this perception of
congressional primacy by empowering Congress to make laws necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the powers vested in the judicial branch."" In
short, federal legislation brought the Supreme Court into being, and such laws
must therefore be well within Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
The first Congress readily assumed this authority when it enacted the Ju-
diciary Act of 1789, which established the federal court system. 7 The Act created
a Supreme Court consisting of a Chief Justice and five associate Justices,
established a quorum of four, and provided that the Court would meet at the "seat
of government" twice a year, commencing the first Monday in February and the
first Monday in August.78 It even covered mundane details of judicial administra-
tion, such as granting the Court the authority to hire a clerk of the Court.7 9
Congress also mandated that Supreme Court Justices do double-duty as circuit
court judges; in addition to meeting in the nation's capital as the Supreme Court,
each Justice was required to travel the country to hear cases in his dual capacity
as circuit court judge. For more than 100 years, the Justices accepted Congress's
of the existing Court rests on an act of Congress."); FALLON ETAL., supra note 70, at 20 ("The judiciary article of
the Constitution was not self-executing, and the first Congress therefore faced the task of structuring a court
system . . ."); JAMEs E. PFANDER, ONE SUPREME CouRT 2 (2009) (Article III "creates a framework for the federal
judiciary and leaves Congress in charge of many of the details."); Edward A. Hartnett, Not the King's Bench,
20 CONsT. COMMENT. 283, 284 (2003) ("Until an Act of Congress spelled out such specifics, there would be no
Supreme Court...."); WILLIAM R. CAsm, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 25 (1995) ("[The]
Constitution created only the bare bones of a federal judicial system and left many details to be fleshed out by
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.").
If Congress had not enacted legislation establishing the Supreme Court, the Court might nonetheless have
come into existence had the President nominated a Chief Justice who was then confirmed by the Senate. Thus,
congressional legislation was perhaps not required to establish the Supreme Court, though such legislation was
surely envisioned by the Framers, as evidenced by the First Judiciary Act.
75. PFANDER, supra note 74, at 2. See John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent,
50 DUKE L.J. 503, 532 (2000) ("Congress's necessary and proper power is precisely the power to provide those
rules that will enable the other two branches to do their jobs more effectively.").
76. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the
President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 102 (1976).
77. See generally An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 STAT. 73 (1789). The
First Judiciary Act has special constitutional significance because it was enacted by a Congress composed of the
Framers' contemporaries, including a number of the Framers themselves. Accordingly, that Act is "widely
viewed as an indicator of the original understanding of Article III." FALLON ET AL., supra note 70, at 21. If
nothing else, then, the Act reveals that the First Congress assumed it had the constitutional authority to regulate
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authority to force them to perform this onerous, and sometimes dangerous, task.8 o
Congress continues to control by legislation most of the areas over which
it initially assumed authority in 1789. For example, federal laws currently in
place authorize the Justices to hire librarians, marshals, clerks, law clerks, and
secretaries to assist them in their work."' The size of the Court,8 2 quorum
requirements,83 dates of the Court's sessions,84 and oath of office" all continue to
be set by statute. A federal statute even purports to control the outcome of a
case should the Court foresee the absence of a quorum for two Terms in a row.
Under such circumstances, the Court must issue an order affirming the lower
court's judgment, which shall "have the same effect" as an affirmance by an
equally divided Court-that is, no precedential effect at all.8 Almost everyone
accepts Congress's broad authority to enact legislation affecting the day-to-day
operations of the Court.
Congress's control over judicial administration generally provides important
context for its authority over judicial ethics specifically. If the Constitution had
spelled out the details of the Supreme Court's operation, or delegated to the Court
the power to establish its own internal operating rules, then perhaps Congress
would not have the authority to enact ethics legislation--or, for that matter, any
legislation regarding judicial administration. But the Supreme Court is not an
isolated institution intended to operate entirely free from the political branches-
to the contrary, it has always depended on the political branches to lay out the
parameters governing its exercise of judicial power. Ethics legislation is not sui
generis, but rather is simply one particular category of legislation within the
broader field of judicial administration-a field in which Congress has always
played a major role. Congress's authority over judicial ethics is less surprising
once one realizes that Congress has long assumed the power to regulate many
important aspects of the Court's daily activities.
2. OBJECTIONS
Opponents of ethics laws might argue, however, that legislation setting the
Court's size and the dates on which it is to hold its sessions are necessary for the
Court to function, but laws regulating ethics are not. Although ethics rules might
promote and enhance the Supreme Court's reputation, they are not as vital to the
80. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to law
obligating Supreme Court Justices to sit as circuit judges); see also CASTO, supra note 74, at 55 (describing
circuit riding as a "physically arduous task that [the Justices] found irksome").
81. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 671-675 (2012).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
83. Id.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2012). Congress's power over the rules of precedent is hotly debated. See, e.g.,
Harrison, supra note 75.
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Court's exercise of judicial power as those regarding membership and meetings
dates. Furthermore, once the Court was up and running, it could write its own
code of ethics if it so chose, and thus Congress had no reason to take such action
on the Justices' behalf.
The problem with these arguments is that they prove too much. Congress has
enacted many statutes that are not essential to the Court's very existence-such
as laws dictating the oath of office for new Justices87 and the responsibilities
of circuit Justices 88-without any Justice raising a constitutional complaint.
Furthermore, as soon as the first Supreme Court was confirmed and began to meet
regularly it could have taken charge of all aspects of its administration, includ-
ing its composition and the dates of its sessions, and yet no one argues that
Congress's administrative authority over the Court began and ended with the
Judiciary Act of 1789.89 Accordingly, Congress does not lack the authority to
regulate the Justices' ethical conduct just because the Justices could conceivably
assume that responsibility for themselves.90
Skeptics might also question whether Congress's authority under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause to regulate judicial administration supports more in-
trusive regulation of the Justices' ethical conduct. But a closer look reveals that
even the more mundane housekeeping measures share the same purpose as the
ethics legislation discussed in Part II: to ensure that the Court's exercise of
judicial power is both effective and legitimate. 9' For example, the quorum
requirement protects the Court as an institution from being co-opted by a
87. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012).
88. 28 U.S.C. §§ 42, 43 (2012).
89. See, e.g., PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE PoLTrnCS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 20-21 (1st ed. 1973)
("The separation of powers doctrine could conceivably have provided the federal courts with a rationale for
developing inherent plenary power over their own procedures and administration. But instead, judges and their
allies looked then, and would continue to look, to Congress for enabling legislation."). The Justices of course do
exercise significant control over the procedures by which they hear cases. The point is not that the Court has no
authority to manage its own internal operations, but rather that Congress has significant authority in this area as
well.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment provides an additional source of legislative
authority over judicial ethics. Ethics statutes not only enhance the reputation of the Court, they also protect
litigants' Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. An
essential component of due process is the right to have one's case heard by an impartial decision maker. Rules
restricting gifts and outside income, prohibiting the Justices from engaging in political activities, mandating
disclosure of their finances, and requiring them to recuse from cases in which they have an actual or perceived
bias directly serve these purposes.
91. See, e.g., Gordon Bermant & Russell R. Wheeler, Federal Judges and the Judicial Branch: Their
Independence and Accountability, 45 MERCER L. REv. 835, 846 (1995) ("Settled constitutional practice dem-
onstrates that [judicial] independence is consistent with Congress's exercise of its authorization, appropriation,
and oversight powers, as well as its authority to regulate judicial rulemaking, internal disciplinary procedures,
and general administrative operations.") (footnotes omitted); Stephen B. Burbank, The Past and Present of
Judicial Independence, 80 JUDICATURE 117, 122 (1996) (noting that "[flor most of our history the federal courts
had no central organization and were dependent on the political branches not only for budget allocations but for
administrative support," which, he argues, supports the constitutionality of legislation affecting the administra-
tion of the federal courts).
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small subset of Justices. Likewise, laws enabling the Justices to hire law clerks
and librarians directly support the Justices' ability to research legal questions and
write reasonable and just opinions resolving cases. Similarly, ethics legislation
seeks to protect the quality of judicial decision-making, as well as the reputation
of the judiciary itself, by mandating that the Justices avoid potential conflicts of
interest.
Indeed, some laws long viewed as purely administrative seek to control
judicial behavior in much the same way that ethics legislation does. For example,
Congress requires all newly confirmed Justices to "solemnly swear" that they
will "administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor
and to the rich" and "faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the
duties incumbent upon them before taking their place on the Court."9 2 The
purpose of requiring the Justices to take this oath is to promote fair and impartial
judicial decision-making, which is the same goal fostered by laws requiring
recusal and restricting the Justices from accepting gifts and outside income. In
other words, it is hard to argue that Congress lacks authority to enact laws
concerning the Justices' ethical conduct and yet at the same time concede that
Congress can control vital administrative matters such as the Court's staff size
and the words of the oath, because these laws all serve the same purposes and
intrude in similar ways on the Court's exercise of judicial power.
More specifically, Congress's authority to mandate recusal procedures and
standards for the Justices is supported by its uncontested power to establish both
the total number of Justices who will sit on the Court and the number that
constitutes a quorum of that Court. Some Justices and commentators have argued
that the Supreme Court cannot, or should not, be subject to the same recusal
standards as the lower courts because recused Justices cannot easily be replaced,
leading to the possibility that a recusal will bar the Court from hearing a case
because of a lack of quorum, or that the recusal will effectively operate as a vote
against the Petitioner both at the certiorari stage and then on the merits.9 3 Another
92. 28 U.S.C. § 453.
93. See, e.g., Statement of Recusal Policy (1993) (statement signed by seven of the Justices on the Court at
the time, which outlined their policies regarding recusal and declared more generally that they should not recuse
themselves "out of an excess of caution" because "[elven one unnecessary recusal impairs the functioning of the
Court."); Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 915-16 (noting that possibility of a tie
vote and the fact that recusal operates as a vote against petitioner); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972)
(memorandum of Rehnquist, J., denying motion to recuse) ("There is no way of substituting Justices on this
Court as one judge may be substituted for another in the district courts. There is no higher court of appeal which
may review an equally divided decision of this Court, and thereby establish the law for our jurisdiction."); 2011
Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, supra note 1, at 9 (The "Supreme Court consists of nine Members
who always sit together, and if a Justice withdraws from a case, the Court must sit without its full
membership."). But see Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming Off the Bench: Legal and Policy
Implications ofProposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the Supreme Court, 61 DuKE L.J. 81
(2011) (discussing the constitutional and policy concerns raised by a proposal to allow retired Justices to sit by
designation in place of recused Justices).
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concern is that recusal will lead to affirmance by an evenly divided court,
preventing the Court from setting precedent on the matter. But these outcomes,
even if not ideal, are surely constitutional. Congress initially staffed the Court
with only six Justices, then expanded and contracted its membership over the
next eighty years before finally settling on its present size of nine in 1869.9'
These changes in the Court's membership raise some of the same issues that a
recusal of one of the nine would create today. Yet no one claims that Congress
transgressed constitutional limits on its authority over the Court by altering the
Court's size permanently, further supporting Congress's authority to mandate
recusal for actual or perceived conflicts of interest.
Some scholars contend that even if Congress has the authority to regulate the
ethics and recusal standards for lower the federal courts, that authority does not
extend to the U.S. Supreme Court. (And Chief Justice Roberts appears to agree,
though the statements in his 2011 Year-End Report were intriguingly cryptic on
this point.9 ) Admittedly, Congress's authority to create or abolish the lower
federal courts gives it more leeway over the structure and subject matter
jurisdiction of those courts than it has over the Supreme Court, which is a
constitutionally-required institution. That said, it is hard to see how this
distinction strips Congress of power over the Justices' ethical conduct. As just
discussed, the Necessary and Proper Clause enables Congress to enact legislation
to facilitate the federal courts' exercise of judicial power. The fact that the
Supreme Court is constitutionally required means that Congress cannot eliminate
or disempower it completely, but does not affect Congress's power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to enact legislation enabling it to function
effectively.
3. CONCLUSION
In sum, Article 111's silence, coupled with Congress's authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, empowers Congress to enact legislation to regulate
judicial ethics, just as it enables Congress to enact legislation concerning the
Court's size, meeting dates, and other vital administrative matters. That said,
Congress's power over the Supreme Court's internal operations is not unlim-
ited.9 As discussed further below, Congress's authority over the administration
of the Court, including the Justices' ethical conduct, is limited by the need to
94. See FALLON Er AL., supra note 70, at 27.
95. See generally 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, supra note 1.
96. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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protect the Court's decision-making from external interference and preserve its
position atop the judicial hierarchy. 9 7
B. LIMITS ON CONGRESS'S POWER TO REGULATE JUDICIAL ETHICS
Although Congress has constitutional authority to regulate judicial ethics, its
powers are constrained by other constitutional values, such as the separation of
powers and the need to preserve judicial independence. This Part describes the
constitutional constraints on Congress's powers to establish ethical rules for
federal judges generally, and for Supreme Court Justices in particular.
1. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The Constitution protects federal judges' decisional independence-that is,
their ability to issue judicial decisions free from fear that their compensation will
be diminished or that they will be forced from office.9 8 This principle is derived
in part from the fact that the Constitution established three separate and co-equal
branches of government. More specifically, Article III provides judges with life
tenure and protection against reduction in compensation, and the only mecha-
nism for removing federal judges is impeachment and conviction for "Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."" As Alexander Hamilton
explained in Federalist No. 79, the purpose of these provisions is to ensure that
judicial decision-making is insulated from political branch influence.'"' Accord-
ingly, congressional regulation of judicial ethics must respect these boundaries.
However, the constitutional protection provided for judicial decision-making
does not mean that the judiciary as an institution enjoys complete autonomy. 01
To the contrary, as previously discussed, Congress has significant authority under
the Necessary and Proper Clause to regulate the federal judiciary's subject matter
jurisdiction, budget, structure, size, and even the dates and locations of its
sessions. Congress may exercise some control over the judiciary through these
mechanisms, even if it must be careful to avoid interfering with judges' decisions
97. Cf PFANDER, supra note 74, at xiv ("Article I also constrains the political branches by requiring respect
for the Court's position at the top of the federal judicial department.").
98. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing
Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 965 (2002) ("Everyone agrees that we need 'decisional in-
dependence,' meaning judges' ability to adjudicate facts and interpret law in particular cases 'free from any
outside pressure: personal, economic, or political, including any fear of reprisal."') (quoting Archibald Cox,
The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON L. REv. 565, 566 (1996)).
99. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 4.
100. See THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Bourne ed., 1901).
101. Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms
in Congressional Regulation, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 160 (2003) ("[T]he judicial independence the Constitution gives
to the third branch is counterbalanced by powers the Constitution delegates to the first branch to promote
judicial accountability."); Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 98, at 975.
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in specific cases.102
The ethics legislation described in Part II does not directly conflict with the
Constitution's Good Behavior and Compensation Clauses. No such argument
could reasonably be made with respect to financial reporting or limitations on
outside gifts and income.103 Nor are laws requiring judges to recuse themselves
from specific cases in which they have a conflict of interest equivalent to
permanent removal from the bench. The disciplinary measures permitted under
the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, although serious, do not violate these
textual limits on Congress's authority over the courts.104
But are such ethics statutes at odds with the purpose of the Good Behavior
and Compensation Clauses, and with separation of powers principles generally?
Conceivably, these facially-neutral laws could be administered so as to in-
fluence judicial decision-making, thereby undermining the Constitution's goal of
ensuring judicial independence. For example, an appellate court might vote to
disqualify a district court judge from a high-profile case because the appellate
judges object to her judicial philosophy rather than because they believe she has
any recusal-worthy conflict under Title 28, Section 455 of the United States
Code. Or a committee of judges investigating an allegation of misconduct under
102. See Geyh, supra note 101, at 163 (describing the decisional independence/institutional dependence
dichotomy).
103. Six federal judges challenged the constitutionality of the Ethics in Government Act's financial reporting
requirements shortly after the law was enacted, in part on the ground that penalty for failing to file would
unconstitutionally diminish their salary. The Fifth Circuit rejected all of their arguments, and the Supreme Court
denied their petition for a writ of certiorari. See Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981). The leading treatise on judicial ethics states, "Following this holding, the
validity of financial disclosure statutes seems certain." JAMEs A. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICs
§ 8.02A (4th ed. 2007).
104. There is some debate whether the provision permitting significant caseload suspensions might come
close to an attempt to remove a judge without impeachment. The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act permits
the circuit judicial council to order that no further cases be assigned to a judge for a "time certain" if the
committee thinks it necessary to "assure effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts."
28 U.S.C. § 354(a). Judge Stephen Chandler challenged the constitutionality of the disciplinary system in place
in 1970 under which the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit barred him from hearing new cases, but the Court
sidestepped the issue. See Chandler, 398 U.S. at 77. Thus, the constitutionality of such indefinite suspensions
remains an open question.
However, the Supreme Court's own practice supports the constitutionality of such suspensions. In 1975,
seven of the Justices agreed that they would not assign the writing of any opinions to Justice William Douglas or
issue a judgment in any 5-4 decision in which he was in the majority because they feared he had become
mentally incompetent. See Letter of Oct. 20, 1975, reprinted in DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHo ONCE
WAS WHIZZER WHrrE 463-65 (Free Press 1998); see also See Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants,
10 GREEN BAG 79, 89-90 (2006) (describing the incident and concluding that the "constitutionality of what
amounts to collusive compulsory informal secret recusal is an open question, but the raw fact that the Court has
engaged in this form of self-management is not") (internal footnote omitted).
Nonetheless, taking cases away from an Article III judge for any significant period of time comes
uncomfortably close to the constitutional line. Thus, this provision of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
should not be extended to the Supreme Court. Aside from this one provision, however, the ethics laws do not
come close to conflicting with the letter of the Good Behavior and Compensation Clauses.
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the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act might penalize a judge for his votes in
previous cases rather than because they found the judge had engaged in
misconduct. If legislation like the Murphy Bill becomes law, some of those who
are unhappy with the outcome of the Supreme Court's decisions are sure to file
ethics complaints, without regard to whether the Justices violated their ethical
obligations. Although Article III judges are less likely to manipulate ethics laws
to influence judicial decision-making than their political branch counterparts,' 05
it is certainly possible.'06 Does this risk of abuse place the constitutionality of
these laws in doubt?
The answer must be no. The possibility that a neutrally-worded law could be
administered in an unconstitutional manner is a problem that afflicts legislation
regulating any aspect of the federal judiciary. As previously discussed, federal
legislation controls many aspects of judges' and Justices' lives, ranging from the
number of administrative assistants they can hire, to courtroom security, to the
budget for office supplies. All of these laws are written in neutral terms and yet
could conceivably be manipulated to penalize judges for their decisions. Surely
Congress is not barred from enacting such legislation simply because it could
be misused in this way.' 0 7 Of course, Congress cannot seek to control the out-
comes of cases in the guise of regulating judicial ethics. But as long as such
legislation is neutral in its application-applying to all judges and Justices, and to
all litigation-it does not undermine the decisional independence protected by
the Constitution. 0 8
Finally, it is worth noting that separation of powers generally, and judicial
independence in particular, are constitutional values that protect all Article IH1
105. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT' THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 134-35, 174 (1973) (arguing
that statutes providing for judicial self-regulation are constitutional because they do not give Congress power to
sanction judges); Shane, supra note 21, at 240 (noting that the threat to judicial independence from judicial
self-regulation is limited by the "traditions and training of the federal judiciary, as well as the institutional
caution invariably exhibited in all systems of self-regulation").
106. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEx.
L. REv. 1, 76-77 (1989) ("[T]o be meaningful, article III's [Good Behavior and Compensation Clauses] must
protect judges not only collectively from other branches, but also individually from harassment by other
judges."); see also Chandler, 398 U.S. at 141-43 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that judicial self-discipline can
be abused).
107. Cf Harrison, supra note 75, at 540 ("To say that a power may be misused, however, is by no means to
say that it does not exist. All power is subject to misuse, and virtually any government function can be carried
out irresponsibly."). See Geyh, supra note 99, at 160-61 (discussing the potential constitutional limits on
Congress's power to retaliate against federal judges' for their decisions); see also Martin H. Redish, supra
note 18, at 69, (discussing the potential constitutional limits on legislation reducing support staff or other
judicial resources).
108. Cf Charles G. Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of Political Rhetoric,
56 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 911, 919 (2006).
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judges, not just the Justices on the Supreme Court.' 0 9 Thus, any independence-
based limits on Congress's authority to legislate regarding recusal and judicial
misconduct apply equally to legislation affecting all three existing tiers of the
federal judiciary. The conclusion that Congress is barred from regulating any
aspect of judicial ethics is hard to square with the decades-old (and in some cases,
centuries-old) ethics legislation." 0
2. THE IMPEACHMENT CLAUSE
Applying the interpretive principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
Constitution's express grant of the power of impeachment to Congress could be
read as an implied bar on Congress's authority to use any other method to
sanction Article III judges or remove them from individual cases.' " If a Supreme
Court Justice violates an ethical norm, such as sitting on a case in which she has
a conflict of interest, some scholars argue that the Constitution provides one
remedy-impeachment-and nothing short of that is permitted." 2 The Framers
may have hoped or assumed that the threat of impeachment would keep judges
and Justices in line, allowing Congress to remove bad apples and at the same time
barring Congress from interfering with the exercise of judicial power.'13
Judicial discipline is not equivalent to impeachment, however. Publicly
reprimanding a judge, or even temporarily suspending a judge from receiving
new cases, is not equivalent to permanently removing a judge from the bench.
Thus, the negative implication from the Impeachment Clause prohibits stripping
judges of their judicial power permanently through any method short of
109. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View ofArticle III: Separating
the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 221 (1985) (asserting that all Article III judges have
"structural parity" because they all benefit from life tenure and protection against salary reduction).
110. See infra Part IV (discussing the history of congressional regulation ofjudicial ethics).
111. The Latin phrase expressio unius est exclusio alterius means the "expression of one is the exclusion of
another." This canon of interpretation is most often invoked in statutory interpretation, in which it is cited for the
proposition that a legislature's decision to include specific items in a statute suggests that it meant to exclude
items not mentioned.
112. Shane, supra note 21, at 220 ("[lIt is suggested that all politically controlled disciplinary mechanisms
short of impeachment are precluded by implication because any such mechanisms would undermine the value
of judicial independence that the [Good Behavior and Compensation Clauses] are intended to protect.");
id. at 223 ("A number of commentators assert that the arguments demonstrating the exclusivity of impeachment
as a political device for judicial discipline exclude any possibility of judicial discipline through judiciary-
dependent devices such as prosecution or judicial self-regulation."); Virelli, supra note 17, at 1211 ("The
constitutional principles at stake similarly support a literal reading of the Impeachment Clauses that would
exclude unmentioned remedies like recusal.").
113. See, e.g., Chandler, 398 U.S. at 141-42 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[N]o word, phrase, clause, sentence, or
even the Constitution taken as a whole, gives any indication that any judge was ever to be partly disqualified or
wholly removed from office except by the admittedly difficult method of impeachment by the House of
Representatives and conviction by two-thirds of the Senate."). But see McBryde v. Comm. to Review Cir.
Council Conduct and Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 264 F.3d 52, 64-65
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting Judge McBryde's argument that the impeachment clause precludes all other methods
of disciplining judges).
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impeachment, but should not be read to bar milder forms of discipline."14
Expressio unius arguments are often suspect, particularly in constitutional
interpretation. The Constitution failed to spell out many aspects of the federal
judiciary's organization and operation, and yet no one questions Congress's
power to legislate on at least some matters that affect the day-to-day operations of
the federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court."' The Constitution is a
broadly-worded document sketching out the framework of the United States
government; it was never intended to address every question that could arise
regarding the relationship between the branches. In other words, despite the
Constitution's silence on these questions, it is understood that Congress must
play an active role in the administration of the federal courts.116 With this as the
background rule, the impeachment clause should not be read as an implied bar to
all legislation regarding judicial ethics." 7
Furthermore, the impeachment-or-nothing argument is dangerous for jurists
and for litigants, and thus it is hard to imagine that by including impeachment the
Framers meant to prohibit all other forms of discipline. For example, a judge
might commit a minor ethical violation-failing to report a spouse's employ-
ment, for example-which would be troubling, but would not rise to the level of
serious misconduct for which impeachment has always been reserved." 8 If the
only method of regulating judicial misconduct were impeachment, Congress
might resort to this ultimate sanction more often than the Framers intended, and
more often than would be healthy for judicial independence.' Alternatively,
114. See, e.g., McBryde, 264 F.3d at 67 ("In short, the claim of implied negation from the impeachment
power works well for removal or disqualification. But it works not at all for the reprimand sanction, which bears
no resemblance to removal or disqualification. . .").
115. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLtuM. L. REv. 324,
357 n. 140 (2006) ("Congress is indisputably authorized to engage in some regulation of the federal courts.")
116. See supra Part II.A.
117. See, e.g., McBryde, 264 F.3d at 65 (stating that the Impeachment Clause should not be read to bar
methods of judicial discipline that fall short of removal).
118. See Stephen Shapiro, The Judiciary in the United States: A Search for Fairness, Independence, and
Competence, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 667, 680 (2001) ("At both the federal and state level, impeachment has
proved to be an unwieldy and insufficient method of disciplining judges."); see also Chandler v. Judicial
Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) ("But if one judge in any system refuses to abide by such
reasonable procedures [regarding the effective administration of the courts] it can hardly be that the
extraordinary machinery of impeachment is the only recourse."); Edward D. Re, Judicial Independence and
Accountability: The Judicial Council's Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 8 N. KY. L.
REv. 221, 253 (1981) ("That impeachment is cumbersome and unwieldy, and is no real deterrent to aberrant
behavior, may perhaps be best demonstrated by our national experience.").
119. Federal Judge John Pickering was impeached and convicted in 1804. Although Pickering was
"hopelessly insane," he had not committed "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors," which
are the only constitutional grounds for impeachment. As experts on federal judicial administration observed,
"[Pickering's] removal foreshadowed the problem of having to rely solely on impeachment for judicial
removal." See Russell R. Wheeler & A. Leo Levin, Judicial Discipline and Removal in the United States,
Federal Judicial Center Staff Paper 5 (1979), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/judidisc.pdf/
$file/judidisc.pdf.
2013] 467
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHics
Congress might refrain from taking any action, leaving judges free to engage in
serious, but not impeachment-worthy, offenses without fear of consequences.
Either way, the result would diminish the courts' legitimacy in the eyes of the
public-a result at odds with the Framers' goals. 12 0
Litigants would also suffer in a regime in which impeachment was the only
method of disciplining a Justice. Due process demands an impartial judge1 21;
impeachment is a post hoc remedy that will do nothing to alleviate the due
process violation suffered by a litigant whose case was decided by a biased
decision-maker. Recusal statutes are a means of removing biased or incompetent
judges before harm is done, which impeachment cannot do.12 2
3. JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
The Constitution states that the judicial power "shall be vested in one supreme
Court." The creation of the lower federal courts is left to Congress's discretion,
and the Constitution declares that those courts are "inferior to" the Supreme
Court. Thus, the Supreme Court is the only constitutionally required Court, and it
sits atop the federal judiciary.
Arguably, the Court's special status constrains Congress's power to enact
ethics legislation in two ways. First, Congress must show proper respect for the
Court's role at the head of a co-equal branch of government; and second,
Congress cannot disrupt the constitutionally-required hierarchy that places the
Supreme Court above the "inferior" courts.'2 3 For these reasons, some scholars
have expressed doubts about Congress's power to regulate Supreme Court
Justices' ethical conduct, particularly if such legislation would give lower federal
court judges the power to discipline the Justices. 124
a. Status
The Supreme Court's status does not pose an obvious obstacle to federal
legislation regulating the Justices' ethical conduct as individuals. Most ethics
120. But see Louis J. Virelli IH, Congress, the Constitution, and Supreme Court Recusal, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1535, 1535-36 (2012) (arguing that Congress should use various indirect constitutional tools, such as
impeachment, to "influence the Justices' recusal practices").
121. See, e.g., Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57,61-62 (1972) (finding a violation of the Due Process
Clause where the decisionmaker had a financial interest in the proceeding); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254,
271 (1970) ("[A]n impartial decisionmaker is essential.").
122. Virelli suggests that litigants seek to recuse biased Justices pursuant to the Due Process Clause. See
Virelli, Congress, the Constitution, and Supreme Court Recusal, supra note 120, at 1604-05. But the Court's
current practice is to allow each Justice to decide for him or herself whether recusal is required, which
demonstrates that the Court has not been sensitive to the Due Process concerns raised by recusal requests.
123. A few scholars argue that the lower federal courts are not constitutionally required to be subordinate to
the Supreme Court. For further discussion of this debate, see infra note 125.
124. Cf Shane, supra note 21, at 236 (stating that the "argument for maximum judicial independence is
fairly compelling at the Supreme Court level.").
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regulation applies to the Justices' conduct off the bench, and not to the Supreme
Court as an institution. For example, existing ethics legislation bars judges and
Justices from engaging in political activity and from taking money or gifts from
parties with matters before the court-that is, extra-judicial activities. Although
these laws are intended to protect the legitimacy of judicial decisions, they do not
directly regulate exercise of the judicial power.
Because these laws seek to regulate the behavior of judges and Justices off the
bench, the Court's status would appear to be irrelevant. As a constitutional matter,
Article III judges are treated alike, in that they all benefit from the same life
tenure and compensation guarantees, and they all exercise the same "judicial
Power." In fact, Justices can and do serve as judges on the lower courts. In other
words, the Supreme Court's special constitutional status as an institution does not
translate into special constitutional status for the Justices.
Unlike most other ethics legislation, recusal laws do apply to the Supreme
Court Justices acting in their judicial capacity, and thus directly raise the question
whether Congress can regulate the head of a co-equal branch of government.
However, the Constitution does not bar Congress from enacting legislation
seeking to safeguard the executive and judicial branch's exercise of their
constitutional authority. Rule of law concerns, and the principle that "no man is
above the law," justifies ethics legislation affecting all federal officials in all three
branches of government. In fact, the financial disclosure requirements that apply
to Supreme Court Justices also require annual disclosures by the President and
Vice-President of the United States. Thus, there is no constitutional basis for
concluding that Congress lacks the power to regulate the conduct of Supreme
Court Justices simply because of their position at the head of the federal judiciary.
b. Hierarchy
Article III specifies that there shall be "one supreme Court" and describes all
other Article III courts as "inferior."1 2 5 Most federal courts scholars conclude
from this language that the lower courts must be subordinate to the Supreme
Court and that Congress cannot enact legislation that would disrupt this
125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The Constitution also grants the Supreme Court "appellate Jurisdiction" to
review the judgments of "inferior" courts, which places these inferior courts in a subordinate position to the
Supreme Court on at least those matters over which the Supreme Court can review and reverse them. See
James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court s Supervisory Powers, 101 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1515, 1518-19 (2001); see also JAMES E. PFANDER, supra note 72, at xii ("Apart from creating one
'supreme' court with supervisory authority, the Constitution takes care to ensure that all other adjudicative
bodies remain inferior to that one court .. . Inferiority means that the courts and tribunals in question must
remain subject to the oversight and control of the Supreme Court."). However, Congress's power to make
"Exceptions" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction undermines the Supreme Court's power over the
"inferior" courts. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris
Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 276 (1992) (stating that Article III's Exceptions and Regulations Clause "plainly
diminishes the extent to which the Supreme Court is hierarchically dominant over the inferior courts.").
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relationship. For example, James Pfander argues that this language bars Congress
from completely insulating lower federal court decisions from Supreme Court
review.12 6 Similarly, Evan Caminker contends that "inferior" courts are constitu-
tionally obligated to follow the decisions of their superiors, rendering vertical
stare decisis a constitutional requirement that cannot be overridden by federal
legislation. 127
If the inferior courts must remain subordinate to the Supreme Court, then
arguably Congress cannot assign the lower federal court judges a supervisory
role over the Justices' ethics. The Murphy Bill delegated to the Judicial
Conference of the United States the authority to "establish procedures" to
"review" and "investigate" complaints against the Justices, and to take "further
action where appropriate." It also gave the Judicial Conference the authority to
"establish a process" by which a Justice's refusal to recuse herself is reviewed by
"other justices or judges of a court of the United States." The Judicial Conference
is chaired by the Chief Justice, but its membership consists of judges on the
circuit and district courts. If one adopts the strictest reading of the supreme/
inferior dichotomy by concluding that it requires that lower courts be subordinate
to the Supreme Court, and that it bars judges on those courts from policing the
Justices' ethical conduct, then the Murphy Bill's delegation of authority to the
Judicial Conference raised constitutional questions.12 8
To avoid this potential constitutional problem, the best practice would be for
the Justices to sit in judgment of each other's alleged ethical violations. Although
hierarchical purists might argue that the Judicial Conference has no authority to
require the Justices to follow those rules because that would upend the
126. PFANDER, supra note 74, at xii.
127. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REv.
817, 832-34 (1994). A few scholars disagree, however, asserting that the supreme/inferior dichotomy refers not
to the lower courts' subordinate status, but rather to their restricted geographic and subject matter jurisdiction,
which would allow Congress to elevate the lower courts over the Supreme Court on at least some matters. See,
e.g., David E. Engdahl, What's in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple "Supreme" Courts, 66 IND. L.J.
457 (1991) ("The same legislative branch that pyramided the judiciary may refashion it however political
wisdom directs, without doing violence to the Constitution."); Hartnett, supra note 72, at 314 (observing that the
"supreme" and "inferior" language may not mean that the lower courts are subordinate to the Supreme Court,
but rather may refer to "breadth of geographic and subject matter jurisdiction"); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H.
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1153, 1180 n.139
(1992) (noting that "supreme" and "inferior" were probably used to distinguish between courts "subject to
narrow geographic and subject matter constraints" and those without such constraints). See also Barrett, supra
note 113, at 344-53 (2006) (summarizing the academic debate on this question and concluding that the
Constitution is unclear).
128. Justice Anthony Kennedy recently testified before Congress that Congress would encounter a
"constitutional problem" were it to attempt to make the Code of Conduct binding on the Justices because it
would be "structurally unprecedented for district and circuit court judges to make rules that Supreme Court
judges have to follow." See Malloy, supra note 56, at 2389; see also Shane, supra note 21, at 236 n.106 (arguing
that it would be "incongruous" to "allow judges whose work is routinely reviewed by the Supreme Court ... to
discipline the justices reviewing them").
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subordinate position the Constitution intended for the inferior courts,12 9 that view
is hard to defend. But the constitutionally-obligated hierarchy does not bar the
Judicial Conference from playing a role in creating the ethics rules that the
Justices would be required to follow. The Judicial Conference is an administra-
tive body, not a court, and it consists of judges from all three levels of the federal
judiciary, including the Chief Justice who serves as its chair. Granting it authority
to establish ethics rules for the Supreme Court should have no effect on the
subordinate status of the inferior courts.13 0
4. "ONE SUPREME CouRr"
The first sentence of Article III states that the judicial power shall be vested in
"one supreme Court." Some interpret this clause to mean that one indivisible
Supreme Court must decide all the cases and controversies that come before it,1 3 1
which would raise constitutional doubts regarding any legislation that required
outside review of a Justice's refusal to recuse him or herself.'3 2 For example, the
Murphy Bill provided that the Judicial Conference must "establish a process" by
which a single Justice's decision not to recuse him or herself would be reviewed
by "other justices or judges of a court of the United States," including retired or
senior Justices, and then delegated to the Judicial Conference discretion over the
composition of the panel. Such a two-tiered decision-making process-and one
that results in the composition of a new "Supreme Court" for the purpose of
reviewing the single Justice's recusal decision-violates a narrow reading of the
Constitution's mandate that there be only one Supreme Court.
The "one supreme Court" language has never been the subject of litigation
129. See Malloy, supra note 56, at 2389 (reporting that Justice Kennedy testified before Congress that it
would be constitutionally problematic to require the Justices to follow ethical rules created by district and circuit
courts).
130. In fact, the Justices are already required to file annual reports disclosing their incomes and obligations to
the Judicial Conference, which then bears the responsibility of reporting to the Attorney General if a Justice fails
to file a report or files a report containing false information. 5 U.S.C. app. 4, § 104(b).
131. See, e.g., Letter from Chief Justice Hughes to Senator Wheeler (Mar. 21, 1937), reprinted in 81 CONG.
REc. 2813, 2815 (1937) ("The Constitution does not appear to authorize two or more Supreme Courts or two or
more parts of a Supreme Court functioning in effect as separate courts."); Ross E. Davies, A Certain Mongrel
Court: Congress's Past Power and Present Potential to Reinforce the Supreme Court, 90 MINN. L. REV. 678, 680
(2006) (stating that "the Framers did indeed read 'one supreme Court' to mean "one [indivisible] supreme
Court"-a single body consisting of all of its available and qualified members to conduct its business."); Cf
2011 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 1, at 9 (asserting that there is "no higher court to
review a Justice's decision not to recuse in a particular case," which is a "consequence of the Constitution's
command that there be only 'one supreme Court.').
132. Russell Wheeler, What's So Hard About Regulating Supreme Court Justices' Ethics?-A Lot,
BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 28,2011) (stating that the "one supreme Court" requirement might bar review of a single
Justice's recusal decision), available at www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/11/28-courts-wheeler; Virelli,
supra note 17, at 1205 n. 140 (stating that proposals to allow lower court judges to review Supreme Court recusal
decisions have "significant constitutional problems ... including Article 111's mandates that there be only 'one
supreme Court," and that Congress have power to create only 'inferior courts."').
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or even much close academic scrutiny, and thus its contours remains hazy.13 3
Most commentators agree that it prohibits Congress from establishing multiple
Supreme Courts populated by different sets of Justices, all empowered to issue
decisions binding on the nation as a whole.134 Far less clear is whether this
language bars the Court from breaking into subdivisions to decide cases or
components of cases,135 or whether it would prohibit the entire Court from
reviewing the decision of one or more of the Justices, particularly on a matter that
was separate from the merits (such as recusal).
In fact, the Court has a long history of empowering a single Justice to make
decisions on preliminary or ancillary matters that continues to this day,
suggesting that the Court itself has never read the "one supreme Court" re-
quirement as an obstacle to this practice. For example, a single Justice can decide
whether to grant an extension of time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari,
order a stay of a lower court's decision, 13 issue a writ of habeas corpus,? or
recuse him or herself.1 3 9 These are all collateral issues, but they can nonetheless
be significant to the litigants and to the outcome of a case.14 0
Although a single Justice's decision often stands as the final word on the
matter, a party may ask another Justice or the full Court to review the decision.
Supreme Court Rule 22 provides that the "party making an application [to an
individual Justice] . . . may renew it to any other Justice, subject to the provisions
133. See Daniel M. Gonen, Judging in Chambers: The Powers of a Single Justice of the Supreme Court,
76 U. CIN. L. REv. 1159, 1197 (2008) (Noting that the "one supreme Court" requirement suggests that there are
limits on Congress's ability to structure the Court's decision-making, but further observing that the
"constitutional text .. . neither indicates what the extent of the 'judicial power' is nor how much delegation of
the Supreme Court's powers would go too far.") (internal footnote omitted).
134. See, e.g., EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 2-3 (9th ed. 2007). But see Byron R.
White, Challenges for the U.S. Supreme Court and the Bar: Contemporary Reflections, 51 ANTrrRUST L.J. 275,
281 (1982) ("Rather than one Supreme Court, there might be two, one for statutory issues and one for
constitutional cases; or one for criminal and one for civil cases.").
135. Tracey George and Chris Guthrie recently proposed doing just that to enable the Supreme Court to hear
a greater number of cases, and they assumed that doing so would not violate the "one supreme Court"
requirement. In their view, dividing the Court into panels would not create more than one Supreme Court, since
each panel would be a stand-in for the full Court. They point out that the courts of appeals currently sit in
three-judge panels to hear most cases, and yet each circuit is still viewed as a single court despite these
congressionally-mandated subdivisions. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States
Supreme Court in the Courts ofAppeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439 (2009).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 2010(f).
138. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) ("Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court [or] any justice
thereof. . ."). In practice, however, individual Justices always refer matters regarding habeas to the full Court.
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 132, § 17.15 at 884-85, § 11.3 at 662.
139. See S. Ct. R. 22 (describing the process by which a party makes an application to a single justice).
140. See Gonen, supra note 134, at 1161. Moreover, in 1802 Congress assigned to a single justice the power
to decide matters arising during the Court's August session-a practice that continued for thirty-seven years
without constitutional objection. Ross Davies gives fascinating discussion of this "rump" Court in his article,
A Certain Mongrel Court: Congress's Past Power and Present Potential to Reinforce the Supreme Court,
90 MINN. L. REV. 678 (2006).
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of this Rule."1 41 When renewed applications do occur, they are usually referred to
the full Court, perhaps to avoid the awkward situation in which one Justice
essentially reverses the decision of a colleague. 14 2 Although it is rare for the full
Court to overturn a single Justice's decision,14 3 it is not unprecedented,
particularly if there has been a change in circumstances."'
The long practice by which a single Justice makes decisions for the Court,
which may then be reviewed by the en banc Court, is at odds with an
interpretation of the "one supreme Court" language requiring that the Court make
decisions as a single, indivisible entity. One way around the problem is to
characterize the decision of a single Justice as tentative rather than a final
decision by "the Court." Today, when a Justice decides not to recuse him or
herself, that decision is final, and thus is usually considered a decision by the
Supreme Court itself. If the recusal question is reviewable by the rest of the
Court, however, then the single Justice's decision not to step aside should more
accurately be viewed as a preliminary assessment rather than a final, binding
decision of the Court. Thus, the one and only Supreme Court decision in the case
would be that of the en banc Court. In fact, the leading treatise on Supreme Court
practice describes all decisions by individual Justices in these terms, explaining
that when an individual Justice grants or denies motions, those decisions are
[N]ot a final resolution of the merits of any case or controversy pending before
the Court ... [but rather] are merely preliminary steps toward invoking the
ultimate power of the "one supreme Court" to resolve a case or controversy that
is properly before the Court for final disposition.145
In short, the requirement that there be "one supreme Court" suggests that the
141. S. Ct. R. 22.4. However, such renewals are "disfavored."
142. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316, 1316 (1973) (Douglas, J., in chambers) (stating that
referrals of renewed applications to the full Court "is the desirable practice to discourage 'shopping around"').
Holtzman involved just such a back-and-forth between individual Justices issuing conflicting in-chambers
decisions. Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman filed suit seeking to enjoin the United States from bombing
Cambodia. The district court issued an injunction, which was then stayed by the Second Circuit. Holtzman then
appealed to Justice Marshall to vacate the stay, which he declined to do. Holtznan, 414 U.S. 1304 (Marshall, J.,
in chambers). Holtzman then renewed her application with Justice Douglas, who issued a stay, noting that
"while the judgment of my brother Marshall is not binding on me, it is one to which I pay the greatest
deference." Id. at 1317. The Solicitor General then applied to Justice Marshall once again. Marshall again
stayed the district court's decision, and noted that he had been in communication with the other members of the
Court, all of whom agreed with him. Id. at 1321, 1322 (Marshall, J., in chambers). Justice Douglas dissented
from that decision, arguing that only a quorum of the Court had the power to reverse his decision and that
"seriatim telephone calls cannot ... be a lawful substitute." Id. at 1323. These events are described in more
detail in Gonen, supra note 134, at 1177-79.
143. See also Rosenburg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 286 (1953) (observing that although the court has
"made no practice of vacating stays issued by single Justices . .. reference to this practice does not prove the
nonexistence of the power; it only demonstrates that the circumstances must be unusual before the Court, in its
discretion, will exercise its power").
144. Rizzo v. Goode, 421 U.S. 902 (1975).
145. GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 135, at 3.
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best practice is to require that a single Justice's decision not to recuse him or
herself be open to review by the full Court.
Of course, another way to reconcile practice with the Constitution's text is to
conclude that the language should not be read so narrowly-a position taken by a
number of scholars.14 6 After all, we consider each federal court of appeals to be a
single court, even though those judges decide most cases in three-judge panels
that can then be reviewed by the entire court en banc.
Accordingly, the Judicial Conference would be on fairly safe constitutional
ground were it to delegate to the full Court the power to review a single Justice's
refusal to recuse him or herself from a pending case. Certainly, it would be
difficult to argue that this practice violates the Constitution's "one supreme
Court" mandate when the Court's own Rules permit applications to individual
Justices followed by full Court review of that Justice's decisions.147
The harder question is whether the Constitution would permit a panel that
included lower federal court judges or retired Justices to review an individual
Justice's refusal to recuse, as the Murphy Bill would have allowed (but not
required). Professors Michael Dorf and Lisa McElroy addressed a closely related
problem in their article describing potential roles for retired Justices. 148 Although
they do not read the "one supreme Court" language to prohibit retired Justices
from substituting for recused Supreme Court Justices in specific cases, they point
out that even if it did, Congress could get around that problem through legislation
manipulating the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Congress has the power
under Article III to make "Exceptions" to the Court's appellate jurisdiction, and
thus it can take away matters that would permissibly fall within the Court's
subject matter jurisdiction, assigning those cases to lower courts.149 The
Constitution permits active and retired Justices to sit on lower courts.15 0 Thus,
Congress could enact a jurisdictional statute that eliminates most of the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction and reassigns those cases to a new court made up
entirely of active Supreme Court Justices. 5 1 (The same nine Justices would also
continue to sit as the Supreme Court, but now the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
would consist only of those few cases over which the Constitution grants the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction, and perhaps a small number of cases within
their appellate jurisdiction to avoid any argument that the Exceptions Clause
does not permit Congress to strip the Supreme Court of all of its appellate
jurisdiction.) Because this new court would technically be an "inferior" court, the
146. See, e.g., George & Guthrie, supra note 136; see also McElroy & Dorf, supra note 93, at 111 (labeling
such an interpretation as "highly formalistic").
147. See S. Ct. R. 22.
148. See McElroy & Dorf, supra note 93, at 109.
149. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
150. In fact, a similar arrangement existed for many years when the Justices were required to sit on circuit
courts whose decisions could be reviewed by the entire Supreme Court.
151. McElroy & Dorf, supra note 93, at 111.
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"one supreme Court" language would not bar review of a Justice's refusal to
recuse herself by a specially constituted recusal court that included lower court
judges and retired Justices. Admittedly, this is an inelegant workaround, but it
demonstrates that review of a Justice's decision not to recuse herself by judges
who are not currently sitting on the Supreme Court can be reconciled with even
the narrowest interpretation of the "one supreme Court" language.
In short, legislation mandating review of a Justice's decision not to recuse
herself can be implemented in a variety of ways to satisfy the "one supreme
Court" requirement. The safest course would be for Congress to assign the
recusal question to the full Court to resolve, ensuring that a single Justice does
not have sole discretion to decide that sensitive question. Whatever the policy
implications of such a practice, it would pass constitutional muster.
C. CONCLUSION
The text of the Constitution does not speak directly to Congress's authority to
regulate the Justices' ethical conduct. Nonetheless, the Constitution does pro-
vide the sources of Congress's constitutional authority to enact ethics legislation
while suggesting important limits on that authority. Most of the ethics legisla-
tion summarized in Part H fits comfortably within Congress's authority under
the Necessary and Proper Clause to establish the Court's structure and daily
operations, including ethics rules. That said, there are a few provisions of the
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, as well as the Murphy Bill, which raise some
constitutional questions, and thus their application to the Supreme Court should
be avoided.15 2 Moreover, Congress must take care to craft legislation that avoids
undermining the Justices' constitutionally-protected independence, as well as the
Court's status as the preeminent court in the federal judiciary.'
The Constitution's text and structure alone are not the last word on con-
stitutional meaning, however. Longstanding practice also plays an important role
in arriving at constitutional meaning. The history of Congress's regulation of the
Justices' ethical conduct is addressed below in Part IV.
IV. THE HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
Congress has long assumed the power to regulate judicial ethics, including
the ethical conduct of Supreme Court Justices. "'[T]radition"' is an "important
source of constitutional insight"154 and is frequently cited by courts and com-
mentators as support for practices that otherwise lack a clear textual basis. 55
152. See supra notes 64 to 150 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 64 to 150 and accompanying text.
154. See Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 178 (2003).
155. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) ("In short, a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before
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Accordingly, Congress's longstanding practice regarding the regulation of
judicial ethics is an essential element of the constitutional analysis.
Aside from the Murphy Bill, the legislation described in Part II has existed for
many decades: Recusal statutes have been in place for over two-hundred years;
judges have been required to publicly disclose their household finances for over
thirty years; judges have been subject to gift and outside income limitations for
over twenty years; and judges have been statutorily subject to investigations and
sanctions for ethical violations for over thirty years.15 6 Furthermore, criminal
laws have long been applied to federal judges prior to, and even in the absence
of, impeachment.15 7 Federal judges, including Supreme Court Justices, can be
convicted and incarcerated for committing crimes, and thus effectively removed
from the bench, without first being impeached (though the two penalties typically
go hand in hand).' 58 As these statutes demonstrate, Congress has long assumed it
has the authority to regulate the Justices' ethical conduct, and the Justices
appeared to concur, at least until Chief Justice Roberts' 2011 Year-End Report
raised new questions.
Over the decades that these laws have been in existence, the Justices have
diligently filed their financial disclosure forms, 159 abided by income and gift
restrictions, and written opinions in which they acknowledge being bound by the
questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such
exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested
in the President by s. I of Art. II.") (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Cf Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of
Judicial Independence 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 315, 320 (1999) ("[Tlhe verdict of history has confirmed some
understandings about federal judicial independence that cannot fairly be imputed to the language of the
Constitution alone.").
156. See supra Part II.A.
157. Scholars debate whether the Constitution permits criminal prosecution in advance, or in lieu, of
impeachment. Compare Shane, supra note 21, at 225-232 (concluding that "the founders probably did not
intend impeachment and conviction to be prerequisites to criminal prosecution") and Gerhardt at note 106, at
29, with Robert S. Catz, Removal of Federal Judges by Imprisonment, 18 RUTGERs L.J. 103, 116-18 (1986).
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled in this issue, a number of circuit courts have concluded that a federal
judge may be prosecuted without first being impeached. See, e.g., United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 845
(9th Cir. 1984) ("[Tjhe Constitution does not immunize a sitting federal judge from the process of criminal
law."); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1142 (7th Cir.) (holding that life tenure does not immunize federal
judges from criminal prosecution), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). There is also some evidence that the
Framers did not view the power to impeach as a prohibition against criminal prosecution. In 1795, the House of
Representatives chose not to impeach Judge George Turner after being informed by the Attorney General that
the Judge would be prosecuted. See Warren S. Grimes, Hundred-Ton-Gun Control: Preserving Impeachment as
the Exclusive Removal Mechanism for Federal Judges, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1209, 1217 n.43 (1991).
158. See Stephen B. Burbank & S. Jay Plager, Forward: The Law of Federal Judicial Discipline and
the Lessons of Social Science, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 & n.13 (1993) (describing criminal prosecutions of three
federal judges in the 1980s); see also United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he
Constitution does not immunize a sitting federal judge from the process of criminal law.").
159. See Judicial Watch, http://www.judicialwatch.org/courts/us-supreme-court/ (collecting the financial
disclosure reports filed by the Supreme Court Justices) (last visited March 16, 2013).
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recusal statute,'60 all without questioning the constitutionality of these laws. On
the relatively rare occasions when Justices have failed to meet the requirements
of the law, they have subsequently corrected their mistakes rather than deny that
Congress has authority to make them do so.'16  The longstanding existence of
legislation regulating the Justices' ethical conduct, together with the Justices'
compliance with these laws, supports the conclusion that this legislation is within
Congress's constitutional authority.
Admittedly, however, Congress has hesitated to apply some of the more
intrusive ethics and disability legislation to Supreme Court Justices. Congress
first enacted legislation mandating recusal of lower federal court judges in 1792,
but did not extend that statute to the Supreme Court Justices until 1948.162 The
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act still does not apply to the Justices. Likewise,
Congress authorized judges on the lower federal courts to set ethical standards for
each other, but has not required the Supreme Court to follow the resulting Code of
Conduct. One scholar contends that the historic exclusion of the Justices from
some ethics and recusal legislation suggests that Congress lacks authority to
regulate Supreme Court Justices as it does judges on the inferior courts.16 3
Congress has never acknowledged such a limit on its authority, however.
Rather, Congress has explained its decision to exclude the Justices from some of
its legislation regulating judicial ethics on policy grounds. For example, the
House Report accompanying the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act states that
the legislation does not apply to the Justices because the "high public visibility of
Supreme Court Justices makes it more likely that impeachment can and should be
used to cure egregious situations."' In other words, the Report concluded that
the Justices' public prominence reduced the need for ethical oversight, but never
160. See, e.g., 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, supra note 1, at 7 (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 455
as the "governing statute" for Supreme Court recusal determinations); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 825 (1972)
(Rehnquist, J., mem.) (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 455 as the "governing statute" for Supreme Court recusal
determinations); Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2000) ("Title 28 U.S.C. § 455 sets forth
the legal criteria for disqualification of federal magistrates, judges, and Supreme Court Justices."); Cheney v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 916, 923 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.) (repeatedly referring to 28 U.S.C. § 455 as
binding on Supreme Court Justices); Statement of Recusal Policy, reprinted in RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION, App. D, at 1101-03 (2d ed. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 455).
161. For example, when Justice Thomas filed an amended financial disclosure report in January 2011, he
explained that he had "inadvertently omitted" information about his wife's employment for several years due to
a "misunderstanding of the filing instructions." See Letter from Clarence Thomas, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court,
to Committee on Financial Disclosure, supra note 37.
162. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 869, 908 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012)).
Prior to 1948, the recusal laws applied only to district court judges. Nothing in the legislative history explains
the reason for expanding the law to apply to appeals court judges and Supreme Court justices.
163. See Virelli, supra note 17, at 1200-02 (noting that Congress waited 150 years before extending the
recusal statute to the Supreme Court Justices, and arguing that this delay has constitutional significance). Cf
Shane, supra note 21, at 236 n. 106 (citing Congress's exclusion of the Supreme Court from the Judicial Conduct
and Disability Act in support of his conclusion that it would be constitutionally "incongruous" to allow lower
court judges to play a role in disciplining Justices on the Supreme Court).
164. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1313,96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 10 n.28 (1980).
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suggested that Congress lacked the power to do so if it wished.
The House Report further states that it would be "unwise to empower an
institution such as the Judicial Conference, which actually is chaired by the
Chief Justice of the United States, to sit on cases involving the highest rank-
ing judges in our judicial system" because doing so might "dilute[]" the
"independence and importance" of the Supreme Court. Although the reference to
judicial "independence" has constitutional overtones, Congress's use of the term
"unwise" suggests it was making a policy choice and not acknowledging a
constitutional limit on its powers over the Court. In any case, it is hard to see how
the constitutionally-enshrined guarantee of judicial independence limits Con-
gress's power to regulate the Justices' ethical conduct but not the conduct of
lower court judges. As discussed in Part III, the judicial independence guaranteed
by the Constitution's life tenure and salary protections covers all Article IHl
judges; Supreme Court Justices have no special or additional claim to indepen-
dence. 165
Congressional regulation of the federal courts will always raise hard constitu-
tional questions about the need to balance legislative power with judicial inde-
pendence. Legislation concerning the Supreme Court Justice's ethical conduct is
a particularly sensitive topic, and one that Congress should approach with
caution. Chief Justice Roberts' Year-End Report has elevated these questions in
importance, demanding that legislators, jurists, and academics think carefully
about the limits on congressional authority to dictate the behavior of Supreme
Court Justices. Hopefully, this Essay will contribute to that discussion.
V. CONCLUSION
This Essay concludes that Congress has broad, but not unlimited, authority to
regulate the Supreme Court Justices' ethical conduct. The source of Congress's
power is derived from the fact that Article III mandates the existence of a
Supreme Court, but then leaves the creation of that Court up to Congress,
165. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See also Amar at note 109, at 221 (asserting that all Article III judges have
"structural parity" because they all benefit from life tenure and protection against salary reduction). But see
Shane, supra note 21, at 236-38 (arguing that the Supreme Court merits greater independence because it is the
only constitutionally required Court and because of its status as the head of the federal judiciary).
The Justices' relationship to the Judicial Conference, which is responsible for investigating and sanctioning
unethical conduct under the Act, differs in important ways from that of lower federal court judges. The Judicial
Conference is chaired by the Chief Justice, but the rest of its members are district and circuit court judges.
Accordingly, the dilution of the Supreme Court's "independence and importance" that concerned the House
Committee might stem not from congressional regulation of the Justices' ethical conduct per se, but rather from
oversight by lower court judges. If so, the problem could be solved by allowing the Justices themselves to
investigate and sanction each other, rather than delegating that task to the Judicial Conference. As noted earlier,
this option is available under the Murphy legislation. For further discussion of the constitutional implications of
allowing lower court judges to investigate and sanction Supreme Court Justices, see supra Part Hl.B.5.
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triggering Congress's authority to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution ... all other Powers vested by this Constitu-
tion in the Government of the United States." 6 6 Congress brought the Supreme
Court into existence by enacting legislation that set its size and the dates of its
sessions, among other vital matters. Ethics legislation is part and parcel of
Congress's power to establish and administer the federal court system. Congress'
authority over the Supreme Court is cabined, however, by the judiciary's
constitutionally enshrined judicial independence and by the need to preserve the
Supreme Court's role at the head of the third branch of government. That said,
Congress has considerable leeway to regulate the Justices' ethics, just as it has
long exercised authority to decide other vital administrative matters for the Court.
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Congress's control over the lower federal courts is further bolstered by its
authority to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. But this provision
of course cannot provide any constitutional authority for Congress's regulation of the U.S. Supreme Court.
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